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1 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) stands
accused of tying the hands of those governments in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that wish to protect their
domestic producers from subsidised agricultural
imports. The dubbing of the current negotiations
as theDohaDevelopmentRound is viewed with scorn
and its anticipated results with apprehension.
How well placed are such concerns?The answer
suggested in this article is that the negotiations
under Doha are of considerable importance but the
current discourse risks underminingAfrica’s effective
participation. In brief, the critics are tilting at
shadows; they are facing away from the real
problems that are creeping up behind. The key
concern is to begin the process of creating
differentiated rules for international trade that reflect
concrete differences of circumstance for countries
and socio-economic groups.
2 WTO rules and African food
security
2.1 How the rules are created
Unless and until theDoha Round is completed there
will be no major new multilateral rules affecting
multilateral trade unless these are “created” through
dispute settlement.The last major set of rule-making
negotiations, the Uruguay Round, was completed
in 1994. Countries were given a period of time to
implement the agreed changes but, in most areas,
these implementation periods have already expired
or are close to expiring.
This does not mean that all countries in the world
now rigorously adhere to the set of rules that emerge
from the Uruguay Round; far from it. There are at
least three reasons:
1. Many WTO texts are vague (because the
negotiators could not agree on a precise
formulation) and different countries are
interpreting their requirements in different ways;
they cannot all be right.
2. Some countries are behind schedule in
implementing the commitments they
acknowledge exist.
3. Others are simply ignoring the rules.
There exist a host of examples of patchy
implementation which can continue indefinitely
unless and until aWTOmember decides to take a
trading partner “to court” by referring the matter
to theWTO dispute settlement regime.Only when
this happens is a quasi-judicial verdict given on
whether or not the defendant is, indeed, complying
with the rules. If it is not, pressure can be exerted
on them to do so.
Because of this, it is almost always wrong to state
that government X cannot do Y because it is
disallowed by the WTO. Only in cases where a
dispute has proceeded to judgement will the
statement be literally true. On the other hand, it
may be the case that indirect pressure is brought
to bear on government X not to do Y, whether
through a threat by a powerful trading partner that
failure to comply will result in a WTO dispute, or
through a donor agency arguing that compliance
is “good for you”.
New rules are created through lengthy
negotiatingRounds.The current one was launched
at the WTO’s biennial Ministerial Conference in
Doha in 2001. It is already well behind schedule.
Doha completed the first of three steps in the
Round: agreement on the areas in which there will
be negotiations and the timetable. The second step
is to agree what is known in the jargon as “the
modalities” and set the parameters within which
countries have to change policy. How many tariff
lines are to be liberalised by how much, which
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subsidies are to be reduced, etc. The last stage
involves bilateral negotiations between eachWTO
member to establish exactly how themodalities are
to be applied in each specific country.
Themost recent step in thenegotiations occurred
in July–August 2004 when a Ministerial meeting
finally agreed not to the modalities but, at least, a
stepping stone towards them.This is described in the
rest of this article as the1August 2004Decision.The
stage is now set for thenext biennialMinisterial (Hong
Kong at the endof 2005) to agree themodalities after
which the last phase of negotiations can commence.
2.2 Difficulties creating special and
differential treatment (SDT)
As long as the rules are vague, partial and patchily
implemented, their failings may not pose problems.
But as they becomemore precise, constraining and
encompassing, anything in them that is
inappropriate to SSA circumstances becomes more
dangerous. Appropriate differentiation and
nuancing – such as is the norm in the domestic
regulations of every state, especially the richest –
becomes essential. It is known in the jargon as SDT.
While theWTOnegotiations pay lip service to the
notionofSDT, there is no clarity onhow it canbest be
operationalised because of misunderstandings and
disagreements over the roleof international tradepolicy
in fostering food security and a vigorous rural sector.
2.3 The systemic problems
There are two systemic problems that bedevil the
creation of effective SDT.One is aparticular concern
for agriculture. It is that the current Agreement on
Agriculture aims to solve a problem that most
developing countries do not have. It is the problem
(prevalent in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) states) of
heavy direct and indirect distortions to their
domestic agriculture that have significant effects
on the worldmarket.Consequently theAgreement
on Agriculture SDT is couched in terms of
moderating the implementation of rules designed
to cure this irrelevant problem rather than dealing
with the problem that most developing countries
do have – which is one of agricultural sectors that
are less robust than they can and should be.
The second systemic difficulty concerns the
decision-making structure withinWTORounds and
applies to all SDT.TheRounds make slow and erratic
progress.There canbe no agreement until themajor
WTO members have obtained compromises with
which they can live, and then there is a strong
imperative to finalise the deal as quickly as possible
before this consensus is disturbed. It is very difficult
to insert precise, relevant binding provisions at a late
stage in the negotiations (when there is considerable
pressure to bring everything to a conclusion) but it
is politically difficult to establish at an early stage
broader, enforceable commitments that would deal
appropriately with any details that are later negotiated.
In other words, by the time there exists sufficient
clarity about the precise “standard” rules that are
being agreed to allow appropriate SDTmodulations
to be designed, it is too late to do so.
2.4 Designing SDT relevant to food security
If current SDT deals with problems Africa does not
have, what are the broad features of themodalities
that would deal with the problems that it does have?
For food security planners and analysts, the concept
of food security has evolved substantially in recent
decades.1 TheWTO has been left largely behind by
a shift in perspective from “self-sufficiency” to “self-
reliance” and needs to catch up.
Since the 1980s, the concept of food security
has shifted away from the national to the household
level, and from the production of food towards
access to food. Sen’s (1987) entitlement approach
has provided a useful analytical framework, in which
production was recognised as one of four possible
sources of food, the others being trade, labour and
transfers.While many countries retain a degree of
scepticism about international commodity markets,
it is now widely accepted that the various sources
of food and income should be seen as additional
and complementary, rather than stark policy choices
between one or the other.
The “security” component of food security is
reflected in the renewed recognition of the
importance of livelihood insecurity or uncertainty
as central to the experience of living in poverty.
Food security is a dynamic concept that implies
stability and reliability of access to food over time.
At the level of international trade, one reason why
developing country governments might resist
deepening their “dependence” on global markets
for staple food needs is anxiety about supply or
demand volatility in those markets.
It is misleading and unhelpful to conflate the
WTO with liberalisation. While a change in a
country’s tariffs is likely to have food security
implications, this is far from being the only way in
which theWTOcan impinge. TheWTO enters the
analysis of domestic livelihoods primarily as a
change in the “rules of the game”. And there are
many such rules that can affect entitlements both
directly and indirectly through their impact on the
latitude open to governments.
WTO rules may bear on four sets of policies,
with different probabilities of effect on livelihood
and food security: a country’s own domestic trade
policy, its international trade policy; and its trade
partners’ domestic and international trade policies.
For many SSA states the order of importance is,
first, the country’s own domestic policy, then its
trade partners’ policies and, last, its own
international trade policy.
Changes to an SSA country’s international trade
policy have their impact on food security primarily
through the effect on the relative prices of things
people buy and sell. Anything that is not 100 per
cent domestic in content – that is, anything that
incorporates any imported or potentially exported
element (which usually means anything involving
road transport) –may experience altered costs and
supplies. The consequences will be felt as a change
in the absolute or relative returns to specific
production- or trade-based livelihood activities.
This may induce producers to shift away from
certain commodities towards others, or perhaps to
diversify out of commodity production altogether.
But other factors  also affect the prices of things
people buy and sell and other WTO rules may affect
these directly or indirectly. These may reinforce or
offset the changes resulting from international trade
policy change. Typical examples are domestically
oriented trade-related policies (such as on price
controls, parastatal policy, etc.), non-trade
international policies (such as on the exchange rate
and foreign exchange convertibility), and the
creation/destruction of institutional infrastructure.
In addition, of course, altered government policies
may affect the availability of physical infrastructure
and supply of transport.
WTO rules on allowable subsidies could affect
the feasibility of input support. New rules on state
trading organisations could impact on the use of
parastatals for domestic as well as international
marketing.An undue focus on tariff reduction is very
unwise: it candivert attention towards unimportant
changes and away from vital ones.Among the latter
are those made by SSA’s trading partners that will
affect the price of agricultural exports and imports.
The recent case brought by Brazil against the EU on
sugar, for example, could have the most profound
consequences for Malawi,Mauritius,Mozambique,
Zambia, Zimbabwe andSwaziland.Changes to world
prices as a result ofOECD subsidy cuts under Doha
may increase the price of SSA imports – with
differential effects on entitlements.
3 Applying the lessons: the
example of special products
If trade rule changes can have multiple, complex
effects on food security, the natural response is to
seek SDT in the WTO that is either similarly
complex (so as to deal with all reasonable situations)
or extremely broad (to cover any of the possible
effects). But both are extremely difficult to negotiate.
The “complex list” approach risks overlooking
many situations (some of which cannot be
anticipated until after the ink is dry on Doha) and
seeing desirable pro-poverty actions struck down
in dispute settlement. The “broad exception”
approach is hard to accept for someWTOmembers
(not necessarily only industrialised countries).There
can be legitimate food security and livelihood
concerns in middle-income, net agricultural
exporters as well as in poor, food importers. If the
“broad exceptions” apply to the richer net exporters,
the industrialised countries will object; if they do
not, there could be adverse livelihood impacts.
The task is to identify enforceable SDTprovisions
that are sufficiently targeted to be negotiable within
the WTO but also general enough to encompass
situations and problems that have not yet been
envisaged. That is a tall order! It is argued by
practitioners that it is far easier to develop the usage
of an instrument that has already been included in
a Decision (in some cases stretching its meaning
far beyond what might have been in negotiators’
minds) than it is to introduce entirely new principles
and concepts into the negotiations.
Because of this, events such as the 1August 2004
MinisterialDecision are of considerable importance.
They provide a set of “pegs” on which SDT
principles can be hung. Because theDecision is still
couched at a high level of generality (there are, for
example, absolutely no indications of by how much
either agricultural tariffs or subsidies will have to
be reduced) the resulting SDTmeasures have to be
similarly broad. But at least they allow a start to be
made on the process.
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With this inmind, what use can bemade of one
of the twopegs of Special SafeguardMeasures (SSMs)
and SpecialProducts (SPs) that havebeen introduced
in the Decision? The concept of SPs is the joker in
the 1 August pack: it emerged suddenly with no
clear guidance of any consensus of their scope and
uses. This means that they could be used in some
creative thinking. The bulk of this sub-section
provides an example, both because it is relevant to
SSA and to stimulate further lateral thinking.
Para. 41 of Annex A to the 1 August Decision
states that developing countries (and only them)
can designate ‘an appropriate number’ of Special
Products which ‘will be eligible for more flexible
treatment’. All the details of how many products
and what sort of flexibility are left to further
negotiation.
Among themost obvious food security uses for
SPs are:
● to avoid any increase in import competition for
products that are particularly important for the
rural economy
● to protect government revenue for use on food
security expenditure by maintaining tariffs on
items that yield significant revenue.
In addition, the very absence of any detail may be
used to support more creative usages. The 1 August
Decision restricts the selection of SPs to developing
countries but it is silent on how the “more flexible
treatment” is to be accorded. It does not state, for
example, that the flexibility is only to be provided
in the developing country’s own schedule of
commitments.A literal reading of the text, therefore,
opens up the possibility that among the “flexible
treatment” to be allowed in relation to Special
Products that are SSA exports is flexibility on the
part of the importing state to design its schedule of
commitments in such a way as to support the
livelihoodobjectives notedby thedeveloping country
member when it established its Special Product. In
other words, it may be possible to use SP as a link to
measures in preference-giving countries that might
be useful for preference-receiving states.
4 Next steps
There is still a great deal to be done to insert into a
Doha Agreement measures that would begin the
process of making the rules relevant to the
circumstance of African agriculture. It will be a
struggle –mademore difficult because of the highly
human-resource intensive system of negotiation
within the WTO and the systemic problems that
there is no consensus for broad dispensations to be
agreed at this stage, but little possibility of devising
precise ones by the time the negotiations have
reached a point at which this would be feasible.
This simply reinforces the point made at the start
of this article, that if African governments, civil
society and researchers are looking in the wrong
direction, the chances of success are greatly reduced.
SDT that would, for example, give all of SSA a
moratorium on implementing any of the changes
agreed in the Doha Round would be a better
outcome than a requirement that they implement
quickly wholly undesirablemeasures – but it would
be very much a second best. It wouldmean that no
attention had been given to the task of creating (at
least in embryonic form) rules that are relevant to
Africa. It would simply defer the problem until the
next round after Doha.And it wouldmake that task
more difficult (becauseDoha would have cemented
and reinforced the current “one size fits all”)OECD-
oriented nature of the rules.
Given the systemic difficulties of theWTO, the
most feasible route for implementation is to start
from the bit that Africa knows best: what sort of
international environment of rules does its
agriculture need in order to thrive?Answering this
question does not require researchers or civil society
to wait until theGeneva negotiations have reached
the details. It involves a parallel process that
converges over time with that operating inGeneva.
By the time the details of the modalities are being
fleshed out, there needs to be a clear statement of
what African agriculture needs from global trade
rules. The one can then be used to implement the
details of the other.
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Notes
* This article draws onCroome (1995); Diaz-Bonilla et al.
(2002); Michalopolous (2003: 24–37, 2001); Stevens
(2003).
1. See Stevens et al. (2003) for further elaboration.
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